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I. BECAUSE THE FACTS WERE UNDISPUTED, THE TRIAL COURT'S 
HEARSAY RULING IS REVIEWED FOR CORRECTNESS 
The trial court's hearsay determination in this instance is reviewed for 
correctness. This Court, in State v. Webster, recognized application of the rules of 
hearsay to a given fact situation is a legal determination. 2001 UT App. 238, \ 9; 32 
P.3d 976, 979. However, since the determination is fact sensitive, the trial court is 
granted a measure of discretion to determine that factual predicate. Id. More 
recently, this Court ruled these "subsidiary factual determinations are reviewed for 
clear error." Salt Lake City v. Williams, 2005 UT App. 493, \ 10. Appellee thus 
argues review of this case requires a mixed standard, but such is not the case. 
Here, the factual predicate was undisputed. The trial court was merely 
applying the law to the given set of facts. (TR 1798) Appellee did not identify any 
underlying facts in dispute nor any rulings of the trial court on underlying factual 
matters. Rather, the trial court made a purely legal determination. "We review the 
legal questions to make the determination of admissibility for correctness." State v. 
Workman, 2005 UT 66, TflO; 122 P.3d 639, 642. As this Court stated, "[t]o the extent 
that there is no pertinent factual dispute, whether a statement is offered for the truth 
of the matter asserted is a question of law, to be reviewed under a correction of error 
standard.5' State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998). The absence of an 
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underlying factual dispute compels review of the trial court's exclusion of Ms. 
Romero's testimony for correctness. 
II. MRS- ROMERO'S TESTIMONY HAS SUFFICIENT 
GUARANTEES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS TO GO TO A JURY 
Mrs. Romero's testimony concerning the instruction of Dr. Chichester to her 
mother has sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to be heard, and weighed, by a 
jury. The issue on summary judgment was whether or not Dr. Chichester told Mrs. 
Nichols she did not need another pap smear. Dr. Chichester argued there was no 
evidence of his fatally improper instruction. Mrs. Romero testified under oath it was 
Dr. Chichester who gave the instruction. (TR 1686) Under Utah law, "it only takes 
one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the 
controversy and create an issue of fact." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 
1097, 1101 (Utah 1995)(citations omitted). Therefore, Dr. Chichester had to keep 
Mrs. Romero from testifying. 
The trial court obliged in ruling Mrs. Romero's testimony was inadmissible 
hearsay. Mrs. Romero argued her mother's statement to her was admissible under 
Rule 807fs residual exception. The trial court found Mrs. Romero's testimony met 
the factors for admission except for sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. 
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Guarantees of Trustworthiness: 
On the most critical issue to the case, Mrs. Romero was unequivocal in 
identifying Dr. Chichester as the doctor who instructed her mother she did not need 
another pap smear. (TR 1686) Mrs. Nichols stated the date of Dr. Chichester's 
instruction in her Complaint, long before Mrs. Romero was ever a party: 
9. On May 17, 1996, Dr. Chichester saw Mrs. Nichols on a routine office 
visit and performed a pap smear, which was negative. 
10. At that time, Dr. Chichester advised Mrs. Nichols that, due to her uterus 
being previously removed, no further pap smears were necessary. 
(TR2). 
Mrs. Romero further testified, "I remember the conversation." (TR 1686) The 
trial court ruled Mrs. Romero's testimony was untrustworthy, however, because she 
was not specific enough in her deposition as to the date of her conversation with her 
mother. In doing so, the trial court improperly encroached on the province of the 
jury. 
A ruling on summary judgment and a ruling on the residual exception have in 
common they both determine what goes to the jury. On summary judgment, "a trial 
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether 
material issues of fact exist." Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1100. "It is not the purpose 
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of the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of 
parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence." Id. at 1101. Similarly, in meeting 
the requirements of admissibility under Rule 807, Mrs. Romero is entitled to rely on 
the same policies extant on summary judgment. The first is that the trial court's sole 
inquiry is whether the elements of Rule 807 are met. The second is that it remains the 
exclusive province of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of 
a witness. 
In Citizens & Southern Bank of Albany v. Swain, Judge Beasley (whose dissent 
was adopted by the Georgia Supreme Court in Swain v. Citizens & Southern Bank of 
Albany, 372 S.E.2d 423 (Ga. 1988)) explained, "Legal trustworthiness is notthe same 
as factual trustworthiness. To meet the legal trustworthiness criterion, the proponent 
need only show threshold trustworthiness. Are there sufficient indicia or 
circumstances present so that the jury may know of the statement and decide for itself 
whether it is trustworthy? It is the jury, of course, which primarily and ultimately 
determines credibility." 366 S.E.2d 191, 194 (Ga. App. 1988). 
Here, the trial court's only proper inquiry was whether the elements of legal 
trustworthiness were present, not to rule on the credibility of Mrs. Romero's 
testimony. Mrs. Romero testified she remembered the conversation with her mother, 
that her mother specifically identified Dr. Chichester as instructing her she did not 
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need another pap smear. This was an informal conversation between mother and 
daughter, long before a diagnosis of cancer or this lawsuit, discussing very personal 
issues that would normally not be shared with others and concerning which Mrs. 
Nichols had no reason to lie. Mrs. Nichols' statement was based on her own personal 
knowledge. She was one of two persons present during her conversation with Dr. 
Chichester discussing a matter of great personal concern. The timing of the 
instruction was provided by the complaint. By taking Dr. Chichester's instruction 
from the jury the trial court ruled Mrs. Nichols either was inaccurate in her reporting 
of the instruction or Mrs. Romero could not credibly testify as to its timing. These 
are jury questions. 
Dr. Chichester argues additional detail cannot be produced at trial. Yet, in 
Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1995), the 
Supreme Court found an expert's affidavit sufficient to overcome summary judgment, 
"although we expect that [the expert's] testimony at trial will be more developed and 
include further specifics." Likewise, Mrs. Romero's testimony was sufficient on the 
critical issue, i.e. it was Dr. Chichester who instructed Mrs. Nichols she did not need 
further pap smears. The detail of precisely when Mrs. Nichols told Mrs. Romero of 
the instruction could be developed at trial with reference to Mrs. Nichols' prior 
assertions and reference to Mrs. Nichols' medical records. 
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None of this is to say the jury would then have to accept Mrs. Romero's 
testimony, but rather it is the jury that must be allowed to assess the testimony. "If 
we are to rely on juries to try the facts and ascertain the truth . . . then we should be 
chary to keep form them bits and pieces of evidence which may assist in the process, 
in however small a way, particularly when they relate to the crucial factual question 
in the case." Citizens & Southern Bank, 366 S.E.2d at 195. 
Nor is this saying all hearsay should be admissible and allow the jury to sort 
it out. Testimony is properly excluded when it does not meet the "high requirements" 
of the residual exception. Here, however, Mrs. Nichols' own assertion of the 
instruction before her death in her complaint (and other discovery as set forth in the 
initial brief) is an indicia of trustworthiness. Mrs. Romero's memory of her 
conversation with her mother long before she became a party to this action is another 
indicia. The personal nature of the conversation and lack of any reason to fabricate 
the instruction are more indicia. Mrs. Nichols' fatal compliance with Dr. Chichester's 
instruction is a compelling indicia of trustworthiness. (TR 1693). That the testimony 
met the other requirements of Rule 807 is undisputed. Therefore, Mrs. Romero's 
testimony was sufficiently reliable to go to the jury and the jury could assess its 
weight and credibility. 
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III. JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS DICTATED ALLOWING THE 
DESIGNATION OF DR. MATVIUW AFTER THE DEADLINE 
The remaining issue before this Court is Mrs. Romero's designation of Dr. 
Matviuw after the expert designation deadline. The Utah Supreme Court recognized, 
"[o]n occasion Justice and fairness will require that a court allow a party to designate 
witnesses, conduct discovery, or otherwise perform tasks covered by a scheduling 
order after the court-imposed deadline for doing so has expired." Boice v. Marble, 
1999 UT 71, If 10; 982 P.2d 565, 568. In her initial brief, Mrs. Romero set forth for 
this Court (as she did for the trial court) the stonewalling of Dr. Chichester in 
avoiding to state the universally accepted standard of care which demonstrated his 
negligence. ] It was only Dr. Chichester's refusal to admit this plain fact that 
compelled Mrs. Romero to hire her own expert. The trial court abused its discretion 
in not allowing Dr. Matviuw5s testimony where justice and fairness dictated such a 
result. 
Dr. Chichester assumes "each of the tactics which plaintiff accuses Dr. 
Chichester of perpetrating was true" but avers such is no basis for extending the 
deadline. Yet, what Dr. Chichester casually adopts as tactics is that conduct forsaken 
by Utah courts as intended "to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the 
1
 See (TR 1798) where the trial court found: "It does not appear that any of the 
medical personnel who have opined on the subject in this case dispute the fact that a 
person with Mrs. Nichols' prior medical history should have an annual pap smear." 
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cost of litigation." See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). Dr. Chichester's tactics are precisely 
those that warrant "justice and fairness" to "require that a court allow a party to 
designate witnesses . . . after the court-imposed deadline for doing so has expired." 
Accordingly, Mrs. Romero did state the proper standard for extending the deadline 
to designate Dr. Matviuw. There was no trial date to delay, no prejudice to Dr. 
Chichester, and no holding of the Utah appellate courts depriving the trial court of its 
discretion. The trial court erred in not allowing Mrs. Romero to designate Dr. 
Matviuw. 
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Respectfully submitted this 2£ day of December, 2005. 
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Fred R. Silvester (3862) 
Spencer Siebers (8320) 
1371 East 2100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 532-2266 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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